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A modern economy is an intricately linked web of specialized production units, each relying on the flow of inputs from their suppliers to produce their own output, which in turn is routed towards other downstream units. 
In this essay, I argue that the structure of this production network is key in deter-
mining whether and how microeconomic shocks—affecting only a particular firm 
or technology along the chain—propagate throughout the economy and shape 
aggregate outcomes. Therefore, understanding the structure of this production 
network can better inform both academics on the origins of aggregate fluctuations 
and policy makers on how to prepare for and recover from adverse shocks that 
disrupt these production chains.
Two recent events have brought to the forefront the importance of intercon-
nections between firms and sectors in aggregate economic performance. Consider 
first the 2011 earthquake in Japan. While the triple tragedy of the earthquake, the 
ensuing tsunami, and the near nuclear meltdown at Fukushima surely resulted in 
a significant destruction of human and physical capital, its effects would have been 
largely restricted to the affected areas were it not for the disruption of national 
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and global supply chains that it entailed. As Kim and Reynolds (2011) reported for 
Reuters in the aftermath of the earthquake:
Supply chain disruptions in Japan have forced at least one global automaker 
to delay the launch of two new models and are forcing other industries to 
shutter plants. . . . The automaker is just one of dozens, if not hundreds, 
of Japanese manufacturers facing disruptions to their supply chains as a 
result of the quake, the subsequent tsunami and a still-unresolved nuclear  
threat.
On a grander scale, the financial crisis, the 2007–2009 recession, and its after-
math have brought with them a renewed emphasis on the complex web of linkages 
that constitute the backbone of the US economy. Terms like “too interconnected 
to fail” or “systemically important firms” have become commonplace in public 
discourse. While this network lingo originated in the confines of an intertwined 
financial sector, it is increasingly used to describe the transmission of disturbances 
across individual actors in the economy. One prime example is the reasoning 
offered in the congressional testimony of Ford’s chief executive officer, Alan 
Mulally (2008), when requesting the government to bail out Ford’s key competi-
tors, General Motors and Chrysler:
If any one of the domestic companies should fail, we believe there is a strong 
chance that the entire industry would face severe disruption. Ours is in some 
significant ways an industry that is uniquely interdependent—particularly with 
respect to our supply base, with more than 90 percent commonality among our 
suppliers. Should one of the other domestic companies declare bankruptcy, 
the effect on Ford’s production operations would be felt within days—if not 
hours. Suppliers could not get financing and would stop shipments to custom-
ers. Without parts for the just-in-time inventory system, Ford plants would not 
be able to produce vehicles.
The common theme across these two  examples is that the organization 
of production along supply chain networks exposes the aggregate economy to 
disruptions in critical nodes in these chains. In particular, whenever the linkage 
structure in the economy is dominated by a small number of hubs supplying 
inputs to many different firms or sectors, aggregate fluctuations may arise for 
two related, but distinct, reasons. First, fluctuations in these hub-like production 
units can propagate throughout the economy and affect aggregate performance, 
much in the same way as a shutdown at a major airport has a disruptive impact on 
scheduled flights throughout a country. In either case, there are no close substi-
tutes in the short run and every user is affected by disturbances at the source. 
Second, the presence of these hubs provides shortcuts through which these supply 
chain networks become easily navigable. That is, hubs shorten distances between 
otherwise disparate parts of the economy that do not directly trade inputs. The 
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upshot of this is that these production hubs act as powerful shock conductors, 
helping to transmit shocks originating elsewhere in the network.
In this essay, I argue that these production networks, by facilitating the propa-
gation of otherwise localized disturbances, provide a bridge between the micro, 
involving the myriad of unforeseen events affecting individual production deci-
sions, and the macro, i.e., their synchronized behavior defining the business cycle.
This synchronization of production decisions over time has led most of modern 
macroeconomics to assume the presence of some sort of aggregate shock, at times 
lifting all boats, at times generating widespread recessions. In doing so, however, 
modern business cycle theory has assumed—rather than explained—comovement 
across producers from the outset. Moreover, after decades of research, the origins 
of these aggregate shocks remain elusive, thus casting doubt on their assumed exis-
tence. Against this backdrop, the promise of production networks is to open the 
black-box of comovement by viewing it as the endogenous outcome of micro shocks 
propagating across input linkages.
I will begin by showing how this novel view can be easily mapped to a standard 
multisector general equilibrium setting where different sectors are interlinked by 
input-output relations. In particular, through a series of stylized examples, I will 
explore how the propagation of sectoral shocks—and hence aggregate volatility—
depends on different arrangements of production, that is, on different “shapes” of 
the underlying production network.
The natural follow-up question is whether we can discipline the set of admis-
sible “shapes” by looking at actual data on production networks. I will do this by 
exploring, from a network perspective, the empirical properties of a large-scale 
production network as given by detailed US input-output data.
Given the properties we observe in the data, I then use the model to ask a 
range of questions: Is the organization of the economy along production networks 
a source of aggregate fluctuations? Can we understand empirical patterns of 
sectoral comovement through this lens? Is the level of sectoral comovement a func-
tion of how far apart the different sectors are in the production network? Do central 
sectors in the production network comove more with the aggregate? In short, can 
traditional tools of network analysis—such as distance across nodes or centrality of a 
given node—help to further our understanding of what shapes comovement?
Finally, I show that the structure of the production network and the strength of 
the propagation mechanism it entails is crucial when confronting a deep-seated and 
influential logic which, to this day, justifies the continued appeal to an exogenous 
synchronization device, in the form of aggregate shocks. This argument, dating back 
at least to Lucas (1977), goes as follows: given that uncorrelated micro disturbances, 
by definition, occur randomly across production nodes, won’t these micro-shocks 
tend to average out as we disaggregate the economy into finer and finer definitions 
of what a production unit is? In other words, won’t these local disturbances tend to 
be diversified away? In turn, doesn’t this imply that we must resort to the convention 
of aggregate shocks? By bringing theory and empirics together, I will argue that the 
answer to these questions is likely to be “no.”
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A Simple Model of Production Networks
I start by showing how these production networks can be mapped into a basic 
general equilibrium setting—a static variant of a textbook multisector model 
without aggregate shocks, following closely the methods we used in Acemoglu, 
Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). I then discuss how different ways 
of organizing these production networks can generate different magnitudes of 
aggregate volatility.
Networks of Input Flows: A General Equilibrium Benchmark
Consider an economy where production takes place at n distinct nodes, each 
specializing in a different good. These goods serve a dual role in the economy: 
on the one hand, each good is potentially valued by households as final consump-
tion; on the other hand, the same good can be used as an intermediate input to 
be deployed in the production of other goods. Here I will focus on this latter role 
and simplify the final demand side of this economy substantially by assuming that 
households value the different goods equally and, as a consequence, consume them 
in equal proportions. In the same spirit, I will assume households provide labor 
services inelastically to the goods’ producers in the economy and spend all the 
resulting wage income in the consumption of the n goods.1
A natural interpretation for these production nodes is to equate them with 
the different sectors of an economy. I assume that the production process at each 
of these sectors is well approximated by a Cobb–Douglas technology with constant 
returns to scale, combining a primary factor—which in this case is labor—and inter-
mediate inputs. The output of sector i is then given by:
 xi = (zi li  ) 1−α  ( ∏ 
i=1
n
  x  ij 
 ω ij  ) α .
In this Cobb–Douglas production function, the first term shows the contribution 
from primary factors to production. The amount of labor hired by sector i is given 
by li , while 1 − α is the share of labor in production. The added element in this first 
term is zi, a sector-specific productivity disturbance, shifting the production possibil-
ities frontier of sector i in a random fashion. This is the only source of uncertainty 
in this simple economy. I assume further that these productivity shocks are inde-
pendent across producers of goods in the economy. The absence of any exogenous 
correlating device—that is, the lack of any aggregate technology shocks—allows 
us to focus solely on the question of interest: can interconnections across produc-
tion technologies, in the form of intermediate inputs flows, generate endogenous 
comovement across otherwise unrelated producers of goods?
1 In other words, on the final demand side I will be assuming that the representative household has 
a Cobb–Douglas utility function with the same weights over the different goods and has no disutility 
of labor.
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These interconnections between production nodes come into play with the 
second term of the production function, which reflects the contribution of inter-
mediate inputs from other sectors. Thus, the term xij denotes the amount of good j 
used in the production of good i. The exponent ωij (≥ 0) in the production function 
gives the share of good j in the total intermediate input use by sector i. 2 For a given 
sector i, the associated list of ωij’s thus encodes a sort of production recipe. Each 
nonzero element of this list singles out a good that needs to be sourced in order to 
produce good i. Whenever a ωij is zero, we are simply stating that sector i cannot 
usefully incorporate j as input in production, no matter what input prices sector i 
is currently facing. Note further that all production technologies are, deliberately, 
being kept largely symmetric: all goods are equally valued by final consumers and all 
production technologies are equally labor-intensive (specifically, they all share the 
same α). 3 The only difference across sectors then lies in the bundle of intermediate 
inputs specified by their production recipe—that is, which goods are necessary 
as inputs in the production process of other goods.
When we stack together all production recipes in the economy, we obtain a 
collection of n lists, or rows, each row giving the particular list of ωij’s associated 
with the production technology in sector i. This list-of-lists is nothing other than an 
input-output matrix, W, summarizing the structure of intermediate input relations 
in this economy. Crucially for this paper, all information in W can be equivalently 
represented by a network, something that has been acknowledged at least since 
Solow (1952) but rarely put to use. The production network, W, which is the 
central object of this essay, is then defined by three elements: i) a collection of n 
vertices or nodes, each vertex corresponding to one of the sectors in the economy; 
ii) a collection of directed edges, where an edge between any two vertices denotes 
an input-supplying relationship between two sectors; and iii) a collection of weights, 
each of which is associated with a particular directed edge and given by the expo-
nent ωij in the production function.
The question is now whether different production networks—that is, different 
arrangements of who sources inputs from whom—matter for comovement and 
aggregate fluctuations. An initial clue is provided by the general equilibrium solu-
tion of the economy just described. In equilibrium, (the logarithm of) aggregate 
2 I will further assume that these shares sum to one for any sector i. As a consequence of the Cobb–
Douglas constant-returns-to-scale assumption and competitive factor markets, these shares are constant 
over time. Anticipating the discussion below, they can be read off the entries of input-output tables, 
measuring the value of spending on input j as a share of total intermediate input purchases of sector i.
3 Additionally, it should be stressed that by imposing a convenient, but nevertheless particular, 
Cobb–Douglas structure to aggregate across intermediate inputs, I am also imposing a unit elasticity of 
substitution across inputs. In reality, for any given technology, there will be some inputs that are crucial 
and difficult to substitute away from, even if their price rises substantially—think fresh fish for sushi 
restaurants in Japan in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster and the ensuing contamination scare—
while others would seem more substitutable—advertising seems like a prime example. Unfortunately, at 
least at very disaggregated levels, we have little evidence regarding the likely range of these elasticities. At 
intermediate levels of aggregation—for example, two-digit industries—Atalay (2014) provides evidence 
in favor of strong complementarity across intermediate inputs.
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value added, y, is simply a weighted sum of the (logarithm of) micro-level produc-
tivity shocks, εi :
 y =  ∑ 
i=1
n
 vi εi ,
where the weights, vi , are determined by the production network, W. 4 This charac-
terization has two important consequences. First, aggregate output is itself random, 
which means that we now have a simple theory of why aggregate output might fluc-
tuate over time. Second, the magnitude of these aggregate fluctuations can now be 
traced back to the production network, in particular, how strongly the underlying 
network propagates micro-shocks across sectors, as encoded by the weights vi .
To understand the specific propagation mechanism at play in this setting, 
it is perhaps useful to go through a thought experiment. Imagine that a favor-
able productivity shock hits one sector in the economy, leaving the productivity 
of all others unchanged. To be concrete, think for example of a major, unan-
ticipated, breakthrough in the production technology of semiconductors which 
decreases the marginal cost of production significantly. Clearly, this supply shock 
will increase the production and decrease the price of semiconductors. As a result 
of this shock, the electronic components sector, which is the key sector down-
stream of semiconductors, also sees its marginal cost decline as one of its key 
inputs has just become cheaper. Electronic component producers will react to 
this by expanding production and decreasing their own price. A second round 
of adjustment now ensues as the many sectors downstream of electronic compo-
nents—computers, precision machines, or communication devices among many 
others—adjust in the same way. As the original shock percolates further through 
the production network, a cascade of adjustments is underway. Ultimately, every 
sector that is directly or indirectly downstream of semiconductors will find it 
optimal to increase production by some amount, potentially leading to a synchro-
nized expansion of economic activity across the board.
Notice that an outside observer focusing solely on aggregate measurements of 
the economy and ignoring the structure of intermediate input trade would conclude 
that a mysterious aggregate productivity shock had just occurred, the source of which 
would necessarily be elusive. In fact, only one of the many production technologies 
4 The competitive equilibrium solution of this basic model economy yields an expression for the loga-
rithm of aggregate value added (that is, GDP), y , given by:
  y = v′ ε, and
  v =  (1 − α) _n  [ I − αW ′  ] −1 1,
 
where 1 is a n × 1 vector of ones and ε is a n × 1 vector of the (logarithm of) sector specific productivity 
shocks, that is, εi ≡ log(zi). Aggregate GDP, y, is a weighted sum of the underlying micro shocks and 
hence a random variable itself. The n × 1 vector v gives the appropriate weight to each sector. When a 
productivity shock hits a given sector, all of the adjustments described in the main text are encapsulated 
in the term [ I − αW ′  ] −1 . The latter object is nothing other than the celebrated “Leontief inverse” matrix 
of input-output analysis.
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in this economy is now more productive. The comovement induced by this idio-
syncratic shock is a feature of general equilibrium adjustments working their way 
through the network of input linkages.
Three Variations on a Theme: Network Structure Matters
These cascading effects via input-output linkages open the door to thinking 
about comovement across sectors and aggregate fluctuations without resorting to 
aggregate shocks. But whether and how an idiosyncratic shock propagates across the 
economy via these linkages depends critically on the way the production network 
is arranged.
To understand how the structure of production networks can matter for 
comovement, I now show that different production networks imply different 
levels for the volatility of aggregate output. Specifically, I explore three  varia-
tions on a four-node economy, by considering three different arrangements of an 
underlying production network, as depicted in Figure 1. Each of these networks 
will imply a different strength for the model’s internal propagation mechanism. 
These can be summarized by what I will call a network multiplier: by how much 
the particular network structure of the economy amplifies idiosyncratic volatility.
Consider first the simplest baseline case: an empty network where there is no 
intermediate input trade in the economy. In terms of the production function given 
earlier, all sectors use only labor to produce the respective consumption good, and 
no sector provides intermediate inputs to any other sector (that is, all ωij = 0 in the 
production function above). Following Bigio and La’O (2013), I dub this case 
the horizontal economy. In this economy, shocks to any given sector will not 
affect any other sector as the propagation mechanism described above is mute. 
As such, there is no amplification of micro-level volatility, and the network 
Figure 1 
Three Production Networks on Four Nodes
Note: From left to right: a horizontal economy with no input trade, a vertical economy with a source and 
a sink, and a star economy with a central node.
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3 4
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multiplier, mH , is equal to 1.
5 If this example seems of little practical relevance, 
it is worth remembering that this horizontal economy closely corresponds to the 
modeling of intermediate goods in most of the macroeconomics literature. Typi-
cally, these models assume that intermediate goods are produced with primary 
inputs alone—that is, there are no flows across intermediate inputs producers—
and are then combined into a final consumption good by a so-called “final good 
aggregator.” In our horizontal economy, the different consumption goods are 
combined into an aggregate consumption bundle through the household’s 
utility function.
In the context of supply chains, it is perhaps more intuitive to consider what 
Bigio and La’O (2013) call a vertical economy, one in which inputs flow unidirec-
tionally from a well-defined upstream sector (think mining of rare earth minerals, 
for example), whose output is successively transformed (magnets made from such 
minerals, which in turn are an input into speakers), and ultimately incorporated 
in the final downstream sector (your smartphone). In network parlance, this is a 
tree or line structure with a single source (the upstream node, with no incoming 
links) and a single sink (the downstream node, with no outgoing links).6 Just as in 
the horizontal economy, shocks to each sector’s productivity growth have a direct 
contribution to aggregate output and hence to aggregate volatility. But because 
sectors are now interlinked, further indirect contributions to aggregate vola-
tility arise. For example, productivity fluctuations at the most upstream source, 
sector  1, now have a first-round effect on its immediate downstream customer, 
sector  2; a smaller, second-round effect on sector  3; and an even smaller third 
round effect on sector 4. Sectors 2, 3, and 4 will then contribute to aggregate vola-
tility in a similar manner as sector 1 except, being closer to the sink node, they 
contribute with fewer higher-order indirect effects. Taken together, the presence 
of these indirect effects—absent in the horizontal economy—implies that the 
production network amplifies idiosyncratic volatility leading to a network multi-
plier mV > mH = 1. This source-sink arrangement of the production network also 
5 In the horizontal economy, equilibrium aggregate output is given by y =  (1 − α) _n   ∑ i=1 n εi (using the 
equation from the previous footnote). Given that, by assumption, there is no correlation in the 
productivity shocks across technologies, the variance of aggregate output is simply  σ y 2 =  (1 − α ) 
2  σ ε 2
 _
4
  mH , 
where mH , the network multiplier associated to the horizontal economy, is equal to 1. In the 
vertical economy, aggregate output volatility is now given by  σ y 2 =  (1 − α)
2  σ ε 2
 _
4
  mV , where the network 
multiplier for this vertical economy is mV  = [(1 + α + α2 + α3)2 + (1 + α + α2)2 + (1 + α)2 + 1]/4. 
Clearly mV  > mH  for any positive share of intermediate inputs. Aggregate output volatility in the 
star economy is equal to  σ y 2 =  (1 − α)
2  σ ε 2
 _
4
  ms where the network multiplier is now given by mS 
=  [  ( 3α + 1 _1 −  α 2  ) 2 + 3 ( 1 + α/3 _1 − α2  ) 2 ] /4. Comparing expressions, it is straightforward to show that 
mS > mV  > mH .
6 See Antràs, Chor, Fally, and Hillberry (2012) for a related discussion on how to extract upstreamness 
measures from input-output data.
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highlights the disproportionate role of fluctuations occurring in more central 
technologies. In this example, sector 1 is the main source of fluctuations in the 
economy, as every other sector in the economy is (directly or indirectly) down-
stream of it.
Finally, consider a more exotic configuration in which a single general 
purpose technology functions as a hub in the network, its output being used 
as the sole intermediate input of all other sectors. Each of the other sectors are 
now populated by specialized input producers, each of which is necessary for 
the general purpose technology to operate. Call this the star economy. While 
necessarily stylized, this star economy captures an important feature of the 
input-output data I analyze below, where general purpose inputs—real estate 
and construction, banking and finance, energy sectors, or various forms of infor-
mation technologies—emerge as hubs in the production network. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, this particular shape of the production network yields the highest 
volatility across the three example economies just described, that is, the associ-
ated network multiplier mS > mV > mH . This heightened volatility comes from 
two sources. First, productivity fluctuations in the hub sector now have a direct, 
first-round, impact on every sector in the economy. Second, despite the fact that 
the remaining technologies are now peripheral, fluctuations in these sectors 
now propagate to all other sectors, as a second-order effect through their effect 
on the hub sector. Thus, hub technologies contribute to aggregate volatility in 
two ways. First, and similarly to the source nodes in the vertical economy, hub 
sectors act as an important source of shocks. However, in this star economy, a new 
role emerges: hub sectors act also as an important conductor of shocks occurring 
elsewhere in the economy.
These three examples demonstrate the possibility that the particular shape of 
the production network may have a bearing on aggregate volatility. But these are 
just a few out of the many configurations possible, even in a highly stylized economy 
with only four nodes. What happens when we take the number of nodes to be very 
large? How are we to choose among this rich menu of possibilities? How can we 
summarize the relevant features of these production networks in data? To make 
progress on these questions, it is necessary to take this network perspective to data 
on disaggregated input flows.
Mapping Production Networks to Data
The empirical counterpart to a network of production technologies consisting 
of nodes that represent different sectors and directed flows that capture input trans-
actions between sectors is given by input-output data. To investigate the network 
structure of sector-to-sector input flows, I use the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Commodity-by-Commodity Direct Requirements Detailed Tables. While the data is 
available from 1972 to 2002 (at five-year intervals) here I only make use of the 2002 
vintage of this data. This breaks down the US economy into 417 sectors, which I will 
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take as nodes in the sectoral input-network. Each nonzero (i, j ) entry is a directed 
edge of this network—that is, a flow of inputs from supplying sector j to customer i.7 
It is worth keeping in mind that the total dollar value of these flows is of the same 
order of magnitude as aggregate GDP itself. While, for double-counting reasons, 
these transactions do not show up in GDP figures, a very large amount of resources 
are devoted yearly to intermediate-input transactions.
For some of the empirical analysis below, I will be focusing only on proper-
ties of the extensive margin of input trade across sectors. To do this, I use only 
the binary information contained in this input-output data—that is, who sources 
inputs from whom—and disregard the weights associated with such input linkages. 
More specifically, I only consider a link to be present if the associated input transac-
tion is above 1 percent of a sector’s total input purchases. With this threshold rule, 
I am discarding very small transactions between sectors and focusing on the main 
components of the bill of goods necessary to the production of any given sector. 
Following this rule, I account for about 80 percent of the total value of intermediate 
input trade in the US economy in 2002. Whenever I bring in the intensive margin, 
I will be using all of the input-output data in the form of intermediate input shares. 
Note that these shares conveniently map to the Cobb–Douglas coefficients for inter-
mediate goods in the production functions introduced in the previous section. 
The 2002 matrix of all such intermediate input shares W02 = {ωij  } i, j=1 n is then the 
directed, weighted network under scrutiny.
Figure 2 provides a network representation of the input-output data in 2002. 
Despite its apparent complexity, we can provide some order by focusing on some 
key statistics summarizing this network. Thus, a first-order characterization of this 
network is its sparsity or low “density”8: there are only 5,217 nonzero edges out of 
a possible 4172, yielding a network density of 0.03. To put it another way: at this 
level of disaggregation, most sectors consist of very specialized technologies that 
only supply inputs to a handful of other sectors. As a result, the number of sectors 
supplied by the average sector—that is, the average “degree” of this network—is 
relatively low at about 11 relative to the total number of sectors in the network.
The Small World of Production Networks
Looking more closely at the figure, another first-order feature emerges: there 
is extensive heterogeneity across sectors in their role as input suppliers. In the data, 
highly specialized input suppliers coexist alongside general purpose input suppliers, 
7 This constitutes the least coarse sectoral data available worldwide and underlies the network analysis 
in Carvalho (2010) and Acemoglu, Carvalho, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2012). Input-output tables 
are available for a large cross-section of countries at a considerably coarser level. In particular, the 
input-output accounts from the STAN database (OECD) consist of 47 sectors and are benchmarked for 
37 countries near the year 2000. Based on this data, Blöchl, Theis, Vega-Redondo, and Fisher (2011) and 
McNerney, Fath, and Silverberg (2013) provide a cross-country comparative perspective on the network 
structure of intersectoral flows.
8 Network density is defined by the fraction of edges that are present in the network relative to the total 
number of possible edges, n2. See, for example, Jackson (2008) for textbook definitions of this and other 
network objects.
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such as iron and steel mills, petroleum refineries or real estate, some of the hub-like 
sectors in Figure 2.
This heterogeneity along the input-supply margin can be conveniently summa-
rized by looking at another network object, its “weighted outdegree” distribution. 
Figure 2 
The Production Network Corresponding to US Input-Output Data in 2002
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, detailed input-output table for 2002. The Figure is drawn with the 
software package Gephi.
Notes: Each node in the network corresponds to a sector in the 2002 input-output data. Each edge 
corresponds to an input-supply relation between two sectors. Larger nodes closer to the center of the 
network represent sectors supplying inputs to many other sectors. The 1–10 labels give the ranking 
for 10 top input suppliers: Wholesale Trade (1), Real Estate (2), Electric Power Generation and 
Distribution (3), Management of Companies and Enterprises (4), Iron and Steel Mills (5), Depository 
Credit Intermediation (6), Petroleum Refineries (7), Nondepository Credit Intermediation (8), Truck 
Transportation(9), and Advertising (10).
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Define the weighted outdegree of a sector as  d  out 
j
 =  ∑ i=1 n ωij , that is, the sum over all 
the weights of the network in which sector j appears as an input-supplying sector. This 
measure ranges from 0 if a sector does not supply inputs to any other sectors, to n if 
a single sector is the sole input supplier of every sector in the economy. According to 
this weighted measure, the typical input-supplier in the data has a weighted outdegree 
of about 0.5. An average input-supplying technology according to this metric would 
correspond to, for example, cutting tools manufacturing (with a weighted outde-
gree of 0.45 and supplying seven other sectors). Many smaller and more specialized 
input suppliers can be found in the data, such as optical lens manufacturing (with 
a weighted outdegree of 0.09 and supplying three other sectors only) alongside a 
handful of general purpose sectors, supplying inputs to many other technologies like 
iron and steel mills (with a weighted outdegree of 5.5, supplying 100 other sectors).
Figure  3 reports the empirical distribution associated with the 2002 input-
output data. The x-axis is the weighted outdegree for each sector, presented on a 
Figure 3 
The Weighted Outdegree Distribution Associated with 2002 US Input-Output Data
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, detailed input-output table for 2002. For more details, see Data 
Appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org.
Notes: The x-axis gives the weighted outdegree for each sector, presented on a log scale. The y-axis, also 
in log scale, gives the probability of finding a sector with weighted outdegree larger than or equal to x, 
that is the empirical counter-cumulative distribution (CCDF).
0.0001 0.001 0.01 0.1 1 10 100
0.01
0.1
1
Weighted outdegree
E
m
pi
ri
ca
l C
C
D
F
From Micro to Macro via Production Networks     35
log scale. The y-axis, also in log scale, gives the probability that a sector selected at 
random from the population has an outdegree larger than or equal to x. Thus, the 
upper left-hand portion of the distribution—where specialized technologies like 
optical lens manufacturing are located—shows that nearly 100 percent of sectors 
have an outdegree greater than 0.01; the middle portion of the distribution shows 
that only about one-tenth of all sectors have an outdegree greater than 1; and the 
right-hand side of the distribution, where we find general purpose technologies like 
iron and steel mills or petroleum refineries, shows that only about 1 percent of all 
sectors have an outdegree measure greater than 5.
Clearly, the empirical distribution of weighted outdegree measures is skewed 
and spans several orders of magnitude, reflecting the very unequal status of different 
technologies in their role as input suppliers. As in other instances where extreme 
inequality is a key characteristic—like the cross-section of incomes, city sizes,  or 
firm sizes—the right tail of this distribution is well approximated by a so-called 
power law distribution. This kind of distribution implies a strong fat-tailed behavior 
in that the probability of finding superstar technologies, far out in the right tail, is 
large enough to render the variance of this distribution infinite.9 The upshot of this 
is that, even as we disaggregate the economy into finer and finer definitions of tech-
nologies, large input-supplying sectors do not vanish.
The presence of this small number of hub-like sectors renders these input-output 
networks into small and closely knitted worlds. In other words, despite the low density 
of sectoral interactions—despite the fact that most sectors do not trade with each 
other—each sector is only a few input-supply links away from most other sectors. In 
network parlance, these types of networks are referred to as “small-world networks” 
in which most nodes are not neighbors of one another, but where most nodes can be 
reached from every other by a small number of hops or steps along the directed edges.
More precisely, in the network literature, small worlds are defined by appealing 
to two related statistics: i) the diameter of the network, defined as the maximum 
length of the shortest path, which is the largest number of steps that separate sector 
i from sector j for all possible pairs of sectors (i, j ); and ii) the average distance, 
defined as the average length of these shortest paths for all pairs (i, j ). When I apply 
these statistics to the detailed input-output data, I obtain a low diameter (relative 
to 417, the total number of sectors) of 10 and a small average distance of 4, thus 
confirming the small-world nature of the US production network.
9 The apparent linearity in the tail of the outdegree distribution when shown in log scales is usually 
associated with a power law distribution. We say that the outdegree distribution follows a power-law if 
the associated counter-cumulative probability distribution P(x)—giving the probability of finding sectors 
with outdegree equal to or greater than x—is given by:
  P(x) = cx−ζ for ζ > 1 and x > 0,
 
 where c is a positive constant and ζ is known as the tail index. A well-known property of this distribution 
is that for 1 < ζ < 2, the outdegree distribution has diverging second (and above) moments. The straight 
line in Figure 3 shows the maximum likelihood fit implied by ζ = 1.44. See Gabaix (2009) for a review of 
power laws and their applications in economics.
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The small-world property has obvious implications for the dynamics of processes 
taking place on networks. In the context of social networks, if it takes only six steps for 
a rumor to spread from any person to any other in society, a rumor will likely spread 
much faster than if it takes 100 steps. Similarly, as I will argue further below, if one 
considers the effect of a production disturbance, shutdown, or default, to a specific 
firm or technology, the small-world effect implies that the original shock will spread 
quickly to most sectors, thus affecting the performance of the aggregate economy.
Searching for Central Nodes in the Production Network
Until now I have focused attention on key technologies as defined by their 
weighted outdegree ranking. These superstar technologies are certainly impor-
tant both as sources of volatility and when propagating shocks occurring in other 
sectors. However, a sector can be key in other ways. For example, consider a sector 
that looks average by its weighted outdegree ranking, but that nevertheless is a key 
input supplier to a widely used general purpose technology. Despite the fact that 
the immediate customers downstream of this sector are few, indirectly—through the 
downstream hub—many production processes can potentially be affected by distur-
bances in the specialized upstream node.10
Identifying the central input-supplying technologies and ranking their roles in 
an economy requires applying an appropriate measure of “node centrality” to the 
production network. While network analysis has developed a variety of centrality 
measures, here I will focus on so-called “influence measures” of centrality, where 
nodes are considered to be relatively more central in the network if their neighbors 
are themselves well-connected nodes. The best known of these recursively defined 
centrality measures is called “eigenvector centrality.” Variants of it have been 
deployed in the sociology literature, notably Bonacich (1972) and Katz (1953), in 
computer science with Google’s PageRank algorithm (Brin and Page 1998), or 
in social networks literature within economics (for example, Ballester, 
Calvo-Armengol, and Zenou 2006). In our setting, the Katz–Bonacich measure 
assigns to each sector a centrality score that is the sum of some baseline centrality 
level (equal across sectors), and the centrality score of each of its downstream 
sectors, defined in the same way.11 Thus, as in the example above, a sector’s 
10 Much in the same way as the impact of an academic article need not be evaluated by its citation count 
alone but also by the impact of the (downstream) articles citing it.
11 To derive the Katz–Bonacich eigenvector centrality measure in our setting consider assigning, to each 
sector j, a centrality weight, cj > 0, which is defined by some baseline centrality level η, equal across 
all sectors, plus a term which is proportional to the weighted sum of the centrality weights of its down-
stream sectors: cj = λ∑i Wij ci + η, for some parameter λ > 0. In matrix form, c = λW ′ c + η1, where W 
is the matrix representation of our production network, 1 is a vector of ones, and c is the vector of 
centrality scores, c′j s. This implies that the vector of centralities is given by:
  c = η(I − λW ′)−1 1.
  
Recalling the expression for equilibrium log GDP in the basic model, the vector c is nothing but the 
vector of Katz–Bonacich centralities given an input-output network W where we restrict η =  1 − α _n  , λ = α (and where α was the share of intermediate inputs in production).
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centrality need not be dictated by its outdegree alone, but will also be deter-
mined by its customers’ outdegree, its customers’ customers’ outdegree, and so 
on ad infinitum.
Remarkably, the sector-centrality scores obtained in this way exactly coincide 
with the sector-specific weights, vi , appearing in the expression for equilibrium 
aggregate output obtained in the previous section. As a result, aggregate growth and 
volatility in our simple multisector model now depends on a well-defined network 
object: the collection of network centralities of the different production technologies. 
Intuitively, more central production technologies in the production network—those 
having more direct or indirect downstream customers—are relatively more impor-
tant in determining aggregate volatility.
On the x-axis of Figure 4 is the (Bonacich) measure of centrality of sectors in 
the 2002 input-output data. The y-axis gives the probability of finding a sector with 
a centrality score larger than or equal to x. Thus, 100 percent of the sectors have a 
centrality measure that is greater than or equal to the most peripheral node in the 
Figure 4 
The Distribution of Sector Centralities Associated with 2002 US Input-Output Data
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, detailed input-output tables for 2002. For more details, see the Data 
Appendix available with this paper at http://e-jep.org.
Notes: On the x-axis is the Bonacich centrality score of the different sectors in the 2002 input-output data, 
where I have imposed a baseline centrality measure of η = (1 − 0.5)/417 and a parameter for weighting 
downstream sectors of λ = 0.5. The y-axis gives the probability of finding a sector with a centrality score 
larger than or equal to x, that is, the empirical counter-cumulative distribution (CCDF).
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network—hunting and trapping—with a centrality score of 0.001; about 10 percent 
of the sectors in the network have a centrality measure greater than 0.004, that of 
warehousing and storage; and only about 1  percent have a centrality measure 
greater 0.01, that of truck transportation.
As in the outdegree distribution, there is large variation in the network 
centrality of different nodes, again in the form of a power-law distribution.12 Far 
out in the right tail, we find the central production nodes in the network. Through 
the lenses of our model, sectors such as real estate, management of companies and 
enterprises, advertising, wholesale trade, telecommunications, iron and steel mills, 
truck transportation, and depository credit intermediation alongside a variety of 
energy-related sectors—petroleum refineries, oil and gas extraction, and electric 
power generation and distribution—are seemingly key to US aggregate volatility as 
they sit at the center of the production network.13
Production Networks, Comovement, and Aggregate Fluctuations
Our model of production networks stresses the role of input-supply linkages: 
an idiosyncratic shock affecting a single sector will be transmitted to its downstream 
neighbors in the network and, via the latter, propagate further downstream to other 
production nodes which are only indirectly connected with the original sector. Does 
this model generate testable implications? Can this network perspective shed new 
light on the comovement patterns at the heart of business cycle fluctuations?
Networked Perspectives on Comovement
Comovement across sectors is the hallmark of cyclical fluctuations. As stressed 
throughout this essay, comovement is endogenous from a production networks 
perspective: synchronization arises from micro shocks propagating across input 
linkages. Importantly, this perspective also implies that a very particular pattern of 
comovement should hold in the data. To see this note that, as an original sectoral 
shock to productivity makes its way downstream, its effect should weaken. Intui-
tively, a shock generating a given response in the output and price of the original 
input-supplying sector will generate more muted responses further downstream as 
that input is a smaller part of the total input bill of these sectors. Thus, two sectors that 
are closer in terms of their network distance should comove more.
12 As discussed in note 9, with regard to Figure 3, the straight line plotted in the figure gives the power-
law fit to this data with a tail parameter ξ = 1.48.
13 Clearly, many of these sectors are the superstar sectors that also rank high according to the out degree 
measure. Accordingly, the rank correlation between centrality and outdegree is a very high 0.95. 
Nevertheless, some sectors do change their ranking substantially between these measures. Oil and gas 
extraction, together with other mining activities such as coal, provide the best examples of highly central 
sectors in the network that are nevertheless middling according to their weighted outdegree measure. 
This is because they are key suppliers of downstream general purpose technologies such as petroleum 
refineries or electric power generation.
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To test this hypothesis, I compute sector-level (real) value-added growth rates 
from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry database containing information for 
459 four-digit SIC manufacturing sectors for the period 1958–2009. For each pair of 
sectors, I then compute the respective pair-wise correlation of growth rates over the 
entire sample period and correlate it against the measure of network distance in 
the previous section, which I calculate from the 1987 detailed input-output matrix, 
choosing this date to represent roughly a midpoint of the data.14
In Figure 5, the x-axis gives the network distance across any pair of sectors. The 
y-axis gives the average correlation of sectoral output growth across all sector pairs 
at a given distance in the production network. Clearly, sectors that are closer in the 
production network do comove more. Across all pairs of sectors that directly trade 
inputs, the average annual growth rate correlation is 0.32. Conversely, for pairs of 
sectors that are very distant in the network, the average correlation is only around 
0.1. Another way to relate network distance and comovement is to look at averages 
in the population. Across all sector pairs, the average growth rate correlation in the 
14 The 1987 input-output data disaggregates the economy into 510 sectors. The concordance between 
this input-output table and the NBER database, which only covers manufacturing sectors, is the one used 
in Holly and Petrella (2012), which I gratefully acknowledge.
Figure 5 
Network Distance and Comovement of Sectoral Output Growth
Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and Bureau of Economic Analysis detailed input-
output tables for 1987.
Notes: The x-axis gives the network distance across any pair of sectors. The y-axis gives the average 
correlation of sectoral output growth across all sector pairs at a given distance in the production network. 
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data is 0.21. This is strikingly close to the average growth rate correlation between 
sectors that are four links away, the average distance in the network.
From the vantage point of production networks, this is no coincidence: the 
average level of sectoral comovement in the data, and hence aggregate volatility, 
is in fact implied by a short average distance in our small world of production 
networks. Were the production network to be arranged in some other way, thus 
altering its shock-conducting properties, the average level of comovement would 
change accordingly.
Note that it would be very difficult to rationalize this feature of comovement 
across sectors in a setup with aggregate shocks alone. First, were all sectors to 
respond equally to some exogenous aggregate pulse, Figure 5 should simply display 
a horizontal line: that is, comovement should not vary systematically with network 
distance. Alternatively, if we were to assume that sectors have different sensitivi-
ties to this aggregate shock, the only way to generate a similar pattern to the one 
observed in the data would be to impose in addition a condition that sectors tend to 
source inputs from similarly sensitive sectors. It is unclear what could justify this very 
strong assumption. In contrast, the empirical relation between comovement and 
network distance observed in the data is an immediate implication of our standard 
general equilibrium model of production networks.
As argued earlier, low average distances between sectors are a consequence 
of hubs: that is, low average distances between sectors arise from the existence of 
general purpose inputs that shorten the path between otherwise disparate tech-
nologies. These hubs are, by definition, central nodes in the production network, 
only a short distance away from the majority of sectors. As such, by the same 
network-distance–comovement argument, they should comove more with all sectors 
in the economy and hence with aggregates. Additionally, the presence of these hubs 
will also render other sectors in the economy—those supplying the inputs on which 
the hubs rely—more central. The upshot of this is that productivity fluctuations in 
these very central technologies in the network—those having more (direct or indi-
rect) downstream customers—should be relatively more correlated with aggregate 
output growth.
I again resort to the NBER manufacturing data and to the 1987 input-output 
data to assess the validity of this prediction. I use the former to aggregate sectoral 
growth rates and derive a time series of aggregate manufacturing real growth in 
value added. I use the input-output data to calculate the measure of (Bonacich) 
network centrality—discussed in the previous section—for each manufacturing 
sector.15 As a proxy for productivity fluctuations occurring in central nodes, I take 
the simple average of total factor productivity growth across the ten most central 
sectors in the production network.
Figure 6 plots the resulting series for (aggregate) manufacturing value-added 
growth and our index of productivity fluctuations in the ten most central technologies, 
15 For the centrality calculation, I pick α = 0.5, the average share of intermediate inputs in gross output, 
and n = 459, the total number of sectors.
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for the period 1959–2009. Clearly, the two series track each other very closely. Over the 
entire sample period the coefficient of correlation is 0.80 and highly significant. As 
our network perspective predicts, this correlation is much higher than that obtaining 
for the average centrality sector in the economy (0.29). From an applied perspective, 
this suggests that analysts and policymakers looking to predict the short-run behavior 
of macroeconomic aggregates could benefit from tracking economic activity in only a 
handful of central or systemic sectors.
Several concerns can be raised about this calculation. First, perhaps causality 
runs the other way: not from key sectors to aggregate economic performance as 
a networked perspective implies, but instead from aggregate shocks affecting key 
sectors disproportionately. For this to be the case, productivity in relatively more 
central technologies would need to be more cyclically sensitive. While it is a priori 
unclear why “cyclical sensitivity” should correlate with this very particular and 
nonobvious network centrality measure, this identification problem has not been 
conclusively dealt with in the literature.
An alternative critique is that this correlation simply reflects an underlying 
accounting identity and contains no economic meaning beyond that. After all, 
Figure 6 
Comovement of Productivity Growth in Central Sectors and Aggregate Output 
Growth
Source: NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database and Bureau of Economic Analysis detailed 
input-output tables for 1987.
Notes: The solid line gives manufacturing real value added growth for the period 1959–2009. The dashed 
line gives the simple average of total factor productivity growth across the ten most central sectors in the 
production network.
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high-centrality sectors are likely among the larger sectors in the economy. Hence 
movements in economic activity in these large sectors, for which productivity might 
be acting as a proxy, would mechanically translate into movement in aggregates. 
If this critique is valid, were we to remove the contribution of these key sectors 
to aggregate growth, we should then observe a much lower correlation between 
productivity growth in high-centrality nodes and aggregate output growth. This can 
be easily tested by constructing a counterfactual aggregate manufacturing output 
growth series where we zero out the contribution of the ten most central technolo-
gies. Reassuringly, the correlation between this counterfactual aggregate series and 
our index of productivity fluctuations in these ten most central technologies is still 
a very high 0.76. This is consistent with our network perspective: hub sectors are 
important sources of aggregate fluctuations not because they are large but because 
they synchronize economic activity across the board.
Confronting the (Other) Lucas Critique
While promising as a way to understand the origins of comovement and 
aggregate fluctuations, a skeptic might still reasonably argue that all the intuition 
and results above are just a figment of aggregation. Surely, as we disaggregate the 
economy into finer and finer sectors, independent disturbances across nodes will 
tend to average out, leaving aggregates unchanged and thus yielding a weak prop-
agation mechanism. In fact, this “diversification” argument has a distinguished 
pedigree in macroeconomics and was invoked, for example, by Lucas (1977) to do 
away with the entire outlook proposed in these pages:
In a complex modern economy, there will be a large number of such shifts in 
any given period, each small in importance relative to total output. There will 
be much “averaging out” of such effects across markets. Cancellation of this 
sort is, I think, the most important reason why one cannot seek an explana-
tion of the general movements we call business cycles in the mere presence, 
per se, of unpredictability of conditions in individual markets.
This intuitive yet powerful indictment has been playing out over the years in the 
modern equilibrium business cycle literature and underlies much of its continued 
appeal to aggregate taste shifters or technology shocks. Can a production network 
perspective undo this argument? How does aggregate volatility behave when we take 
the number of nodes in the production network to be very large—as it surely is 
in the economy—while keeping the assumption of no aggregate shocks?
We can recreate Lucas’s (1977) “diversification” argument in our networked 
economy. To see it at play, recall the horizontal economy example introduced 
above. From that discussion it is immediate that, for a generic number of sectors, n, 
aggregate volatility in horizontal economies, σy is of the order of magnitude of   σ ε  _  √ _ n . 
That is, as we disaggregate the horizontal economy further, into more and more 
production nodes, aggregate volatility declines to zero at very rapid rate of  √ 
_
 n . 
This implies that, holding micro-volatility (σε) fixed, as we move from an economy 
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populated by 100 sectors to one with, say, 10,000 sectors, the implied standard devia-
tion of aggregate GDP will be an order of magnitude lower.
However, the network perspective on input flow data renders clear what is 
mistaken about this argument: the US economy looks nothing like a horizontal 
economy where intermediate input producers exist in isolation of each other. 
Instead, the production of each good in the economy relies on a complex set of 
linkages across sectors. As we have seen, these linkages function as a potential 
propagation mechanism of idiosyncratic shocks throughout the economy. How 
strong is this propagation mechanism once we take on board empirical properties 
of production networks? How strong is the multiplier associated with the actual 
US production network?
To answer this question we need two ingredients. First, recall that generi-
cally the aggregate volatility is a function of the centrality scores of the different 
technologies in the US production network. Second, as we have seen, there is 
extensive heterogeneity in these centrality scores: a relatively small number of 
hub-like sectors are far more central than the vast majority of nodes in the produc-
tion network. Based on these two observations, it is possible to show that, for 
empirically relevant production networks, aggregate volatility is of the order of 
magnitude of   σ ε  _ 
 n  1−1/ξ  rather than  
 σ ε  _  √ _ n , where ξ is nothing else than the slope 
of the centrality score distribution in Figure  4. 16 This parameter governs the 
degree of “inequality” in this distribution: the more unequal is this distribution—
which is to say, the more important is the role of a few central input-suppliers 
in the network—the closer ξ is to 1. The upshot of this is that, in a world where 
superstar technologies act as powerful shock conductors, aggregate volatility 
decays much more slowly with the number of sectors, rendering Lucas’s (1977) 
diversification arguments second order.
To understand the power of this seemingly abstruse distinction, consider the 
following back-of-the-envelope calculation. From the NBER manufacturing data, the 
standard deviation of total factor productivity growth for a typical narrowly defined 
sector is 0.06. For, say, 500 sectors, the horizontal economy would then imply aggre-
gate volatility of the order of magnitude of 0.003, a non-starter as a theory of the 
aggregate business cycle, as Lucas (1977) had argued. Instead, if we use the estimate 
for ξ associated with Figure 3, which is approximately 1.4 (see footnotes 9 and 12), 
our theory of production networks now implies non-negligible aggregate volatility 
of the order of 0.01. In a nutshell, sizeable aggregate fluctuations may originate 
16 Under the assumption of idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate volatility in our simple model of production 
networks is given by:
  σy = σε  √ _ ∑ 
i=1
 
n
  υ i 2 ,
 
 where υi is the centrality of node i in the production network. Based on a power law distribution of 
centrality scores, it is possible to show, by applying Gabaix’s (2011) theorem (on the asymptotic behavior 
of sums of independent random variables with power law weights) that for the empirically relevant fat-
tailed regime (1 < ξ < 2) aggregate volatility is of the order of magnitude of  σε _ 
 n 1−1/ε  rather than  
σε _ 
 √ 
_
 n
 .
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from microeconomic shocks once salient characteristics of the production network 
are incorporated into the analysis.
Taken together, the networked structure of production is consistent with 
distinctive patterns of comovement in the data and opens the way for a deeper 
understanding of the sources of aggregate fluctuations without resorting to conve-
nient, but ultimately elusive, aggregate shocks.17
Looking Ahead
Viewing the economy as a complex production network may seem, at least 
initially, as little more than a fuzzy analogy coated in big words. In this essay, I have 
attempted to show that this perspective can indeed offer testable hypotheses and 
insights by mapping it to a standard general equilibrium setup and showing how 
this provides guidance for empirical explorations of input-output data. Looking 
at sectoral comovement from this vantage point, I have shown that the immediate 
implications of this networked perspective cannot be reasonably refuted. Further-
more, as I have discussed, theory and empirics together provide a challenge to a 
long-standing “irrelevance” indictment in the literature. To go beyond these sugges-
tive possibility results, a small but fast-expanding literature on production networks 
is hard at work on a number of important challenges.
First, while throughout this essay I have equated nodes to sectors, input 
sourcing decisions actually take place at the level of the plant or of the firm. So what 
constitutes the relevant node: firms, sectors, or both? Relative to sectors, progress 
on firm-level production networks needs to deal with several added complications. 
On the theory side, it is more difficult to brush aside the complexities of market 
structure (as I have done here by appealing to identical, perfectly competitive firms 
inside each sector). Also, at this level of disaggregation it is clear that we have to 
distinguish between easily substitutable inputs and crucial, hard-to-substitute inputs 
where firms are locked-in and switching costs are large. On the empirical side, rela-
tive to sector-level data, input-output information at the firm-level is in very short 
supply. Recent advances in developing a theory of firm-level networks (Oberfield 
2013) and the availability of novel data sources provide important first steps in 
this direction. For examples of firm-level data sources, see Bernard, Moxnes, and 
17 These conclusions are related to and reinforce the results of an earlier strand of the literature on 
cascading behavior in production networks. One of the early papers is Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and 
Woodford (1993), where the authors describe the distribution of production avalanches triggered by 
random independent demand events. See also Jovanovic (1987) for a notable antecedent to this line 
of research and La’O (2013) for a thought provoking follow-up. These different contributions are not 
based on an empirical description of the network structure, but instead assume very simple interaction 
structures across agents, such as circle networks or periodic lattices.
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Saito (2014) and Carvalho, Nirei, and Saito (2014) for data on Japan, and Atalay, 
Hortacsu, Roberts, and Syverson (2011) for US data.18
Second, the quantification and empirical validation of the network viewpoint 
is another active area of research. Work with calibrated dynamic extensions of 
the simple multisector model set forth here (Carvalho 2010; Atalay 2014) finds 
a far from negligible role for idiosyncratic shocks, echoing the earlier findings 
of Horvath (1999). Our results in Carvalho and Gabaix (2013) regarding the 
dynamics of aggregate volatility are consistent with these findings, although we 
work with a much simpler setting. In Carvalho (2010), I generalize the theoretical 
findings on the decay of aggregate volatility (discussed in the previous section 
of this essay) to a class of dynamic multisector general equilibrium models. In 
another strand of the literature, Foerster, Sarte, and Watson (2011) and Holly 
and Petrella (2012) explore econometrically the equilibrium structure of these 
models and conclude that input-output linkages serve as a powerful amplifier of 
otherwise independent shocks. At the firm-level, a variety of methods have been 
deployed—reduced-form correlations, model-derived decompositions of aggre-
gate volatility, and natural experiments—to argue that the network structure of 
production matters quantitatively (Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh 2013; 
di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Medjean 2014; and Carvalho, Nirei, and Saito 2014). 
Finally, the explicit incorporation of the spatial dimension of these production 
networks—that is, acknowledging the uneven distribution of production nodes 
across space—holds the promise of both better understanding the mechanics 
of shock propagation and of potentially isolating arguably exogenous shocks 
affecting only small parts of the network (Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg, and 
Sarte 2014; Carvalho, Nirei, and Saito 2014).
Third, production network considerations may have a bearing on other areas 
of research in economics. Perhaps the most immediate candidate would be an open 
economy extension of the setup considered here. Can comovement across coun-
tries be the result of the international transmission of shocks through global supply 
chain networks? The recent contributions of di Giovanni and Levchenko (2010) 
and Johnson (forthcoming) are encouraging early steps in this broad direction, 
but there is still nearly everything to explore from a network perspective. Relatedly, 
recent theoretical work on global supply chains and the network structure of inter-
national trade can be another fruitful source of cross-talk on production networks 
(Antràs and Chor 2013; Chaney forthcoming; Costinot, Vogel, and Wang 2013).
In light of the recent financial and economic crisis, another promising agenda 
is to look at financial frictions from a production network perspective. Despite the 
seminal contribution of Kyotaki and Moore (1997), the possibility of cascading 
liquidity shocks in a network of producers has been consistently overlooked. Recent 
work by Bigio and La’O (2013) showing that production networks can serve as a 
18 A burgeoning micro-literature on pricing and intermediation in networks can offer additional insights 
on the theory side. For recent contributions in this area see, for example, Choi, Galeotti, and Goyal 
(2014); Kotowski and Leister (2014); Manea (2014); and Nava (2014).
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powerful amplification mechanism for liquidity shocks represents an important 
step in this under-researched direction, but more remains to be done.
Finally, once one recognizes that network structure is linked to macroeconomic 
outcomes, a more ambitious question emerges: what determines these structures? 
This requires developing a theory where the network of input flows is the endoge-
nous outcome of a well-defined economic model. This research direction is virtually 
unexplored, but see Oberfield (2013) and Carvalho and Voigtländer (2014) for 
some first steps.
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